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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ACCESS TO COURTS-INDIGENT SEEKING DIVORCE
DECREE-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment precludes a state
from denying to an indigent access to the courts pursuant to an ef-
fort to dissolve a marriage, solely because of his inability to pay court
fees.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Petitioners, welfare recipients in the state of Connecticut, sought di-
vorces. Connecticut law requires a judicial decree before a marriage
can be dissolved and prior to attaining the aforesaid decree one must
pay certain fees.' Due to petitioners' impoverished condition they
were unable to sustain these costs and a bar to the courtroom re-
sulted.2 Subsequent action concluded in a three-judge United States
District Court dismissing the complaint 3 and the United States Su-
preme Court noting probable jurisdiction.4
Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority,5 found that civil litigants
seldom have only the judicial process as a means of resolving their
disputes, and as a result access to the courts had not frequently been
considered as an element of due process. 6 However, in this proceed-
ing, Justice Harlan reasoned that because Connecticut law compels
a judicial mandate prior to attaining a divorce, due process rationale
must control. 7 The Court found it an important factor that petition-
I. The Court determined that the average cost for bringing a divorce action was sixty
dollars. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372 (1971).
2. The traditional relief for the problem of the poor faced with court costs is to pro-
ceed "in forma pauperis." Forma pauperis relief is available to the poor in civil proceed-
ings in many states either through express provision of statute or through court developed
extensions of the common law. The types of fees and costs that are waived however differ
radically among jurisdictions. In some, only filing fees are forgiven while in more liberal
jurisdictions both fees and costs are waived. Connecticut does not have forma pauperis
proceeding and is one of the states where there has been no relief through the common
law. Comment, In Forma Pauperis and the Civil Litigant, 19 CATH. U.L. REv. 191, 195
(1969).
3. 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968). The plaintiffs sought a declaration that CONN.
GEN. STAT. RaV. § 52-259 (1968), requiring a payment of court fees, was unconstitu-
tional as applied. They also sought an injunction requiring the state to permit the
plaintiffs to proceed without the payment of any fees or costs. The Federal District Court
held the statute was undesirable but not a denial of a right so fundamental that the
Constitution by the equal protection or due process clause, would forbid Connecticut
from continuing such a system.
4. 397 U.S. 985 (1970).
5. Concurring opinions were filed by Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan. The dis-
senting opinion was filed by Justice Black.
6. 401 U.S. at 375.
7. "For at that point the judicial proceeding becomes the only effctive means of re-
solving the dispute at hand and denial of defendant full access to that process raises
grave problems for its legitimacy." Id. at 376.
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ers must resort to the judicial process to effectively settle their dis-
putes; important enough to bridge the gap between civil and criminal
adjudication,8 and enable Justice Harlan to use criminal litigation
precedent.9 The Court went on to declare that a state must, absent
a countervailing state interest of over-riding significance, give those
who are forced to resort to the judicial forum a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard.10 Applying this principle to the instant case the
Court found that the Connecticut cost requirement statute," being
an effective bar to the judicial forum, was unconstitutional as applied.' 2
The state attempted to propound sufficient interests to offset the
petitioners' opportunity to gain admittance to the court. Fee and cost
requirements as a means of resource allocation and cost recoupment 8
were the state's more significant' 4 interests, which caused the Court
to resort to Griffin v. Illinois.'5 In Griffin, a criminal case, an indi-
gent defendant had his path to the appellate courts blocked by his
Sinability to pay for a transcript; the Court declared this barrier uncon-
stitutional. In Boddie the Court rebuked the state's asserted interest
relying on Griffin in which the same interest was offered and rejected.
They went further by stating that in Griffin the transcript could be
waived as a convenient but not absolute predicate to court admittance,
while in Boddie, Connecticut's cost statute imposes an invariable bar-
rier to court access.'0
The Court explicitly limited its decision to where the good faith
of one's indigency and divorce are beyond dispute. The Court went
on to state that this is not a decision that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment requires all individuals in all circumstances
be guaranteed access to the court. However, in petitioners' circum-
stances, because it has been resolved that marriage is a basic right 8
and the judicial machinery is the only means to effectuate this right,
the doors of the courtroom must not be closed.
8. See Note, 37 FORD L. REv. 661 (1969).
9. 401 U.S. at 377.
10. Id.
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-259 (1968).
12. A statute or rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied, although it can
be a generally valid exercise of state power. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960).
13. 401 U.S. at 382.
14. See Comment, An Indigents Right to an In Forma Pauperis Proceeding in Penn-
sylvania Divorce Litigation-Analysis and a Proposal, 16 VILL. L. R~v. 283 (1970).
15. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16. 401 U.S. at 382.
17. Id.
18. 401 U.S. at 376, citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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While the precedent and reasoning for elimination of almost any
bar to an indigent's ability to obtain a fair trial in criminal proceed-
ings abounds,19 the same cannot be said for the impoverished litigant
in civil adjudication. Prior to Boddie, the Court was faced with a sit-
uation in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Company20 where a
state statute required some of the plaintiffs in a stockholders' deriva-
tive action to post bond before gaining ability to litigate. The Court
held that this statute did not violate the due process or equal protec-
tion clause.21
In Williams v. Shaffer 2 2 the Georgia Supreme Court was presented
with a situation where an indigent tenant sought to remain in pos-
session of his dwelling and defend in a court of law an eviction ac-
tion 3 prosecuted by his landlord. In order to remain in possession
and obtain a trial the tenant had to tender a bond with good security
payable to the landlord for the payment of such sum, with costs, as
may be recovered against him. The tenant was unable to sustain the
bond costs and as a result could not gain court access. The Georgia
Supreme Court did not find a constitutional abridgement and refused
the tenant relief. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari.24 To this denial Justice Douglas voiced a strong
dissent in which he stated that by permitting the Georgia statute to
flourish, the Court is in effect granting a hearing to the affluent ten-
ant and denying relief to the poor tenant. As a result, the ability to
gain entrance to the courtroom is predicated on wealth. Justice Doug-
las reasoned that in the past, financial limitations placed upon judicial
review have been declared void. While recognizing this precedent
was in the field of criminal proceedings and Williams a civil case,
19. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1965), free transcript for habeas corpus pro-
ceeding; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), right to counsel in state criminal
proceeding; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), waiver of filing fees in state court criminal
trials.
20. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
21. In Boddie, Justice Harlan distinguished Cohen. His distinction was mainly on the
basis that in Cohen they considered a statute on its face while in Boddie the Court con-
sidered the application of the statute. Justice Black in his dissent felt that Cohen was
controlling. He stated: "Finally, the effect of both statutes may be to close the state
courts entirely to certain plaintiffs, a result the Court explicitly accepted in Cohen. I be-
lieve the present case should be controlled by the Court's thorough opinion in Cohen."
401 U.S. at 392.
22. 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966).
23. The Georgia summary eviction statute allows a landlord to oust a tenant in a very
rapid manner. The landlord files with a Judge of the Superior Court or Justice of the
Peace an affidavit that the tenant has held over or failed to pay rent. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-302 (1966).
24. 385 U.S. 772 (1967).
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he dismissed this possible distinction by explicitly stating that the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not limited
to criminal proceedings.25
Boddie was a significant advancement in indigent justice. However,
it is suggested the Supreme Court's limitation of due process rationale
to divorce is unacceptable. 26 No reason can be found why the right
to be secure in one's dwelling2 7 or to gain a judgment following a tort
claim2 8 is not as sacred to the impoverished litigant as the right to obtain
a divorce. By curtailing advancement of their reasoning in Boddie, the
Court has in effect allowed court costs to bar an indigent's access to
the judicial process in many instances. 29 Recognition that the indigent
must also have his day in court has been delayed too long.
The Court in Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad30 stated that
the right to sue and defend in the court lies at the foundation of or-
derly government; it is one of the most essential privileges of citizen-
ship.31 It is submitted that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment affords the most effective basis to make the right of access
to the judicial process meaningful for the poor. The Court has been
explicit in stating that the right to seek redress in the judicial forum
is a matter of due process.32
Defining the minimum requirements of due process in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Company,33 Justice Jackson declared that it
requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, appropri-
ate to the nature of the case. 34 It appears that in the realm of indi-
gent civil abjudication, because of the barrier imposed by court costs,
a poor litigant is often denied due process. Opportunity to be heard,
an essential of due process, is often illusory to the poor.3 5 As was stated
25. Id. at 773.
26. "In concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that these appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into court to obtain a
divorce, we wish to re-emphasize that we go no further than necessary to dispose of the
case before us, a case where the bona fides of both appellants' indigency and desire for
divorce are here beyond dispute. 401 U.S. at 382.
27. See 385 U.S. at 774.
28. See generally Comment, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 435 (1967).
29. See Willcox and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957).
30. 207 U.S. 142 (1907).
31. Id. at 148.
32. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967).
See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
33. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
34. Id. at 313.
35. See Comment, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J.
516 (1968).
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in a report by the American Bar Association: "Although fees charged
to litigants do not produce nearly enough revenue to operate the fed-
eral and state courts, such fees and ancillary charges are so high as to
constitute a substantial deterrent to the poor litigant if he should pay
these expenses himself." 36
A more effective justice for the poor can be attained by recognizing
that when the judicial process becomes the only means to effectively
settle a dispute37 due process requires that an indigent have an inde-
pendent right of free access to the judicial forum.3 Many states already
satisfy this proposed element of due process by means of existing legisla-
tion. This legislation is in the manner of forma pauperis statutes39
which allow an indigent in legitimate civil litigation to waive court
costs and proceed with his claim in the judicial forum. Further prece-
dent and reasoning for this expansion of due process into civil
abjudication appears in Hovey v. Elliott40 where a trial court refused
to allow petitioner to proceed in a civil case until he paid money into
the court's registry. The Supreme Court of the United States held this
payment of money as a predicate to court access denied petitioner due
process. In a later case, National Union v. Arnold,41 in which failure
to deliver certain bonds resulted in an inability to gain entrance to the
courtroom, the Court failed to apply Hovey and as a result weakened
its precedental value, but not its logic. Justices Douglas and Black
dissenting in Arnold felt the Hovey doctrine should be applied. Justice
Black stated that from its inception due process and equal protection
have meant that every defendant must be allowed to defend himself in
any court where his adversary can appear and prosecute.42
Hopefully, the recognition that due process encompasses access to
the judicial forum in a wider scope than pormulgated in Boddie will
not be delayed. In this manner, the devastating result of the judicial
system and wealth becoming synonomous could be avoided.
John Edward Wall
36. Public Provision for Cost and Expense of Civil Litigation, AMER. BAR FOUND. (1966).
37. This is essentially the test used in a limited scope by Justice Harlan in Boddie.
It was only applied in a divorce action to permit free access to the courts for the im-
poverished litigant. See note 7.
38. See generally Gold, The Poor and Divorce: Boddie v. Connecticut, 3 FAM. L.Q. 281
(1969).
39. See note 2.
40. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
41. 348 U.S. 37 (1954).
42. Id. at 47.
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